Logic & Linguistics (English)
Part I · Reading — what a sentence commits you to
Most reasoning errors begin before inference: the sentence was misread.
- Asserted and presupposed — separate the claim under discussion from the content smuggled in as already settled.
- Scope — enumerate the readings created by multiple quantifiers, negation, modals, and focus operators.
- Polarity and monotonicity — determine which substitutions preserve an inference and why words such as any need particular environments.
- Modality — identify what can, may, must, and should mean relative to an unstated background.
- Conditionals — distinguish material, indicative, and counterfactual conditionals; separate necessary from sufficient conditions; explain why counterfactuals do not chain transitively.
- Implicature — recover the stronger alternative a speaker declined to use, from some rather than all to the deliberately weak reference letter.
- Vagueness — preserve a real distinction despite an unavoidable borderline; separate an unlocatable cutoff from an arbitrary category.
Part II · Structure — what holds an argument up
- Reconstruction — extract premises, conclusion, and the suppressed premise that makes the stated inference work.
- The load-bearing move — locate the single inferential joint on which an argument’s conclusion depends.
- Argument architectures — reductio, dilemma, regress, inference to the best explanation, transcendental arguments, and arguments from cases.
- Defeasibility — state the conditions under which a conclusion expires instead of defending it past its scope.
- Evidence that discriminates — ask how much more likely evidence is under one hypothesis than its rivals; compare all hypotheses at once.
- Causal structure — distinguish confounders, mediators, and colliders, including the correlations created by controlling for the wrong variable.
- Resource reasoning — detect arguments that reuse consumed money, time, headcount, attention, capacity, or locks as though resources were facts.
- Underspecification — find interpretations that satisfy the letter of a definition, metric, or specification while violating its intent.
Part III · Pressure — how arguments manipulate
Every chapter in this part separates abuse from legitimate use and examines the same move in the reader’s own reasoning, not only in an opponent’s.
- Burden shifts — proving negatives, argument from ignorance, loaded questions, isolated demands for rigor, and insinuation with deniability.
- Target swaps — straw men, steel-swaps, motte-and-bailey movement, and definitions whose scope changes under pressure.
- Structural exploits — false dilemmas, false continua, slippery slopes, equivocation, composition, division, and affirming the consequent in prose.
- Scorekeeping — Gish gallops, unfalsifiable retreat, moving goalposts, selective skepticism, cherry-picking, and true but unrepresentative facts.
- Social pressure — manufactured urgency, escalating commitment, emotional flooding, character framing, sealioning, DARVO, audience capture, and fabricated consensus.
- Frame control — naming the issue, choosing the default, policing relevance, extreme anchoring, and moving the apparent center of debate.
Part IV · Frames — reasoning styles worth stealing
- Marginal reasoning — what changes with the next unit, and what is given up to obtain it?
- Equilibrium reasoning — what happens after everyone sees the rule and changes behavior?
- Failure-mode reasoning — what breaks first, under what load, and where is the single point of failure?
- Legal reasoning — who bears the burden, what standard applies, and what fact distinguishes this case from the precedent?
- Base-rate reasoning — how often does this happen before the particulars of the current case are considered?
- Selection reasoning — how did this case become visible, and which comparable cases could never have appeared in the sample?
- Historical reasoning — what preceded the present state, and on which earlier event does it counterfactually depend?
- Transposition — run one live question through several frames and treat their disagreements as information.
Part V · Writing — where the thinking becomes visible
- Writing as exposure — use the page to reveal claims that have no model, premise, or referent beneath their fluent wording.
- Compression — reduce 1,000 words to 40 without losing the inferential structure; what disappears was decoration.
- Form as constraint — use the memo, proof, dialogue, brief, and aphorism to force different failures out of hiding.
- Register and stance — use hedging as calibration; track agency through nominalization and passive voice; distinguish honest uncertainty from escape.
- Steelmanning to signature — restate an opposing view until its proponent would sign the statement unedited.
Part VI · Vocabulary — distinctions as instruments
- Distinctions that change conclusions — type/token; de dicto/de re; ex ante/ex post; necessary/enabling; constitutive/causal; defeasible; underdetermined; orthogonal; endogenous; marginal/average; epistemic/deontic; descriptive/normative; scope; and vague/ambiguous/general.
Part VII · Limits — where the apparatus fails
- Genuine vagueness — cases with no sharp boundary and no rewrite that honestly removes the borderline.
- Self-reference and paradox — where a sentence’s attempt to describe its own status destabilizes ordinary evaluation.
- Value disagreement — conflicts that are not concealed factual disputes and do not dissolve when every empirical claim is clarified.
- Formal and informal judgment — cases where a formal treatment exists but suppresses information that competent informal judgment retains.
- Tacit expertise — when performance depends on pattern recognition that cannot be unpacked into premises without degrading the performance.
Appendix · Formal directions not taken
Cut-elimination, Curry–Howard, Kripke-frame correspondence, categorial grammar, formal semantics notation, and completeness or incompleteness belong to the study of constructing logics. The appendix points outward rather than teaching them here.